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Quantum secret sharing (QSS) and third-man quantum cryptography (TQC) are essential for
advanced quantum communication, however, the low intensity and fragility of multi-photon en-
tanglement source in previous experiments have made their realization an extreme experimental
challenge. Here, we develop and exploit a ultra-stable high intensity source of four-photon entan-
glement to report an experimental realization of QSS and TQC. The technology developed in our
experiment will be important for future multi-party quantum communication.
PACS numbers: 03.65.Ud, 42.50.Dv
With the development of technology, quantum cryp-
tography [1, 2] could well be the first commercial applica-
tion of quantum communication [3]. To extend quantum
communication to more realms, advanced protocols are
needed. Among them, Quantum secret sharing (QSS)
[4] and third-man quantum cryptography (TQC) [5] are
two essential protocols. QSS [4] is a protocol to split a
message into several parts so that no subset of parts is
sufficient to read the message, but the entire set is. In
the scheme, three parties Alice, Bob and Charlie first
share a three-photon entangled state. Charlie can then
force Alice and Bob to cooperate to be able to establish
the secret key with him by performing proper polariza-
tion measurements on his photon and announcing which
polarization basis he has chosen. In a similar manner,
in TQC [5] the third-man, Charlie, can control whether
Alice and Bob can communicate in a secure way while he
has no access whatsoever on the content of the commu-
nication between Alice and Bob.
Although QSS and TQC are essential for advanced
quantum communication, the low intensity and fragility
of multi-photon entanglement source in previous experi-
ments [6, 7, 8] have made their realization an extreme
experimental challenge. While a variant of QSS, i.e.
quantum state sharing [10], has been reported in both
photonic and continue variable systems [11, 12], till now
solely the principle feasibility of an experimental real-
ization of QSS using pseudo-GHZ states was shown [9].
Here, developing and exploiting an ultra-stable high in-
tensity source of four-photon entanglement we report the
first experimental realization of the QSS [4] and TQC [5]
schemes.
To see the necessity of QSS, suppose Alice and Bob
are sent to Beijing as two separate outstations by Char-
lie who is in the parent company in Hefei. When Charlie
wants to send a business instruction to Beijing, the in-
formation should be encrypted because it is a business
secret. However, there is a risk that if one of the two
people received part of the information, they can dishon-
estly sell it to other company for money. Remarkably,
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FIG. 1: Schematic drawing of the QCC and TQC schemes.
QSS [4] can provide a novel way to solve this problem.
The working principle of QSS is shown in Fig. 1A. Sup-
pose that Alice, Bob, and Charlie each holds one photon
from a GHZ triplet that is in the state:
|Ψ〉abc = 1√
2
(|H〉a|H〉b|H〉c + |V 〉a|V 〉b|V 〉c) (1)
where H (V) denotes horizontal (vertical) linear polar-
ization. Each of them randomly performs a projection
measurement on their own photons either along the lin-
ear polarization basis x+/x− rotated by 45
0 with respect
to the original basis, or along the circular polarization
basis y+/y− (right-hand/left-hand). These polarization
basis can be expressed in terms of the original ones as
|x±〉 = 1√
2
(|H〉 ± |V 〉)
|y±〉 = 1√
2
(|H〉 ± i|V 〉) (2)
For convenience we will refer to a measurement of lin-
ear polarization x+/x− as an x measurement and one of
circular polarization y+/y− as a y measurement.
2Representing the GHZ state (1) in the new states by
using 2, we can obtain the perfect correlations among
Alice, Bob and Charlie in some certain combinations of
measurement basis. For example, in an xxx measure-
ment the state (1) may be expressed as:
|Ψ〉abc = 1
2
(|x+〉a|x+〉b + |x−〉a|x−〉b) |x+〉c
+ (|x+〉a|x−〉b + |x−〉a|x+〉b) |x−〉c (3)
This expression implies, first, that any specific result ob-
tained in any two-photon joint measurement is maximally
random. For example, Alice’s and Charlie’s photons will
exhibit polarizations x+x−, x−x+, x+x+ or x−x− with
the same probability of 25% as well as Bob’s and Charlie’s
photons. Second, given any two results of measurements
on any two photons, they can predict with certainty the
result of the corresponding measurement performed on
the other one. For example suppose Alice’s photon and
Bob’s photon exhibit different polarizations. Then by
the second term in (3), Charlie’s photon will definitely
be x− polarized. Therefore, Alice and Bob can exploit
this perfect correlation to jointly create the secret key
with Charlie.
Let us now analyze the quantum correlations of the
state 1 for all the other combinations of measurement
basis, i.e. for xyy, yxy, yyx, xxy, xyx, yxx and yyy
measurements. In the same way, one can easily verify
the following fact: While in the last four combinations
the results that Alice, Bob and Charlie can get are com-
pletely independent (random) to each other, similar per-
fect correlations also exist in the rest three combinations
(i.e. xyy, yxy and yyx). Again, in these three cases,
if Alice and Bob know which measurement basis Charlie
has chosen (i.e. x or y), they can cooperatively determine
what Charlie’s result is.
In this way, if all of them randomly select the x, y po-
larization basis to measure their own photons, then by
announcing publicly which basis they have chosen, and
only keeping those events with the right combinations
of measurement basis, i.e. the xxx, xyy, yxy and yyx
combinations, Alice and Bob can thus jointly establish
the secret key with Charlie. In details, we can use these
measurement results to generate raw keys by the follow-
ing encoding rule: In the xxx measurement, Charlie en-
codes x−(y+) as 1 and x+(y−) as 0, while Alice and Bob
encode x+(y+) as 1 and x−(y−) as 0. For the other com-
binations, Alice, Bob and Charlie all encode the result
x+(y+) as 1 and x−(y−) as 0.
In the QSS scheme, its security can be guaranteed by
randomly choosing the measurement basis and testing
the quantum bit error rate (QBER) of the raw keys.
Moreover, from the above analysis it is clear that after
Charlie uses the generated secret key to encrypt a mes-
sage, none of Alice and Bob can decrypt the message with
her/his individual key and it is only possible for them to
read out the encrypted message after performing a coop-
erative Exclusive OR (XOR) operation.
Another important application of the above perfect
correlations is in the TQC [5]. As in usual telecommu-
nication, it is expected that the necessary resource of
single photons or quantum entanglement in future real-
istic quantum communication will be provided by some
organizations such as a company or the government. It is
reasonable that the providers of quantum resources would
like to have some controls on the users. For example, the
providers would like to hold the right to control whether
the users can communicate in a secure way while, as a
regulation, they have no access whatsoever on the con-
tent of the communication between the users. The TQC
offers a satisfied way to accomplish this purpose.
As it shown in Fig. 1B, in the TQC scheme Alice,
Bob and Charlie also need to share a three-photon GHZ
state 1. However, Alice and Bob are now two users at
two different locations, say, Beijing and Shanghai, while
Charlie in Hefei plays the role of a provider. Similarly,
each of them performs a projection measurement on their
own photons by randomly choosing either the linear po-
larization basis x+/x−, or the circular polarization basis
y+/y−. From (3) we can see if Charlie publicly announces
his measurement results including the basis chosen, Alice
and Bob’s photons can immediately build up their own
perfect correlation. Thus, Alice and Bob can exploit this
perfect correlation to create the secret keys. This exactly
corresponds to the entanglement-assisted BB84 protocol
[1]. Clearly, in this process Charlie has no idea of the
keys which Alice and Bob have created.
On the other hand, if Charlie does not want Alice and
Bob to generate the secret keys he could simply choose
not to announce his measurement results or not to make
any measurement on his photon. Then, if Alice and Bob
continue to finish the x or y projection measurement,
the results that they will get will be completely random.
Therefore, without the help of Charlie they will fail to
generate the secret key. Note that, if Alice and Bob do
not trust Charlie in the beginning, instead of performing
a y measurement on their own photons, they could per-
form a measurement along the H/V basis. In this way,
they can manage to generate some keys with perfect cor-
relation, but they are insecure – indeed any eavesdropper
can acquire the same key without being detected. The
above analysis shows that Charlie can successfully con-
trol the generation of the secret keys between Alice and
Bob while has no access whatsoever on the content of the
communication between Alice and Bob.
The realization of QSS and TQC necessitates a ultra-
stable high intensity source of three-photon entangle-
ment. The experimental setup to generate three-photon
entanglement is shown in Fig. 2(a). An infrared pulse
is focused properly on the LBO crystal (LiB3O5) to
achieve the best up-conversion efficiency creating the
pulse of ultraviolet (UV) light. Then the created UV
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FIG. 2: Experimental setup for QSS and TQC. (a) The
UV pulse generated by up-conversion inside the LBO crys-
tal passes through the BBO crystal twice to generate two
pair of polarization-entangled photons to prepare the desired
three-photon GHZ state. The UV laser with a central wave-
length of 394 nm has a pulse duration of 200fs, a repetition
rate of 76 MHz, and an average pump power of 430mw. By
optimizing the collection efficiency, we are able to observe
about 2 fourfold coincidence per second behind 3.6 nm filters
(F) of central wavelength 788 nm. (b) Each of Alice, Bob,
and Charlie randomly performs a projection measurement on
her/his own photon. The BS is used to select basis randomly
to measure the photons. The HWP (λ/2) and QWP (λ/4)
are used to perform x+/x− and y+/y− measurement. If and
only if there is one click is registered at each of the receivers
and trigger, they individually record the measurement result.
pulse passes through a beta-barium borate (BBO) crys-
tal twice to produce two polarization-entangled pho-
ton pairs, where both pairs are in the state |Ψ〉 =
1/
√
2 (|H〉|H〉+ |V 〉|V 〉). One photon out of each pair
is then steered to a polarization beam splitter (PBS)
where the path lengths of each photon have been ad-
justed (by scanning the Delay position) so that they ar-
rive simultaneously. After the two photons pass through
the PBS, and exit it by a different output port each, and
there is no way whatsoever to distinguish from which
emission which of the photons originated, then corre-
lations due to four-photon GHZ entanglement
∣
∣Ψ4
〉
=
1/
√
2 (|H〉|H〉|H〉|H〉+ |V 〉|V 〉|V 〉|V 〉) can be observed
[7, 8]. In the experiment, by performing a x+ polariza-
tion projective measurement onto one of the four outputs,
the remaining three photons are prepared in the desired
GHZ-state (1) with a visibility of 83%.
To achieve the necessary ultra stability and high inten-
sity, various efforts have been made. Different from pre-
vious four-photon experiments [7, 8], to avoid the damage
to the up-conversion LBO crystal caused by the focusing
laser beam, we assemble the LBO crystal in a closed but
transparent tube of oxygen. Moreover, by using thicker
and more rigid fiber holder in a compact set-up and by
focusing the UV pump onto the BBO crystal, we achieve
both better collection efficiency and production rate of
entangled photon pairs with a ultra-high stability. In
our experiment, after achieving the perfect time over-
lap between the two photons coming into the PBS the
four-photon entanglement source with a 2 four-fold co-
incidence per second can be stabilized for a couple of
weeks. Thus, we managed to finish all the required mea-
surements without the need of scanning the Delay posi-
tion.
In order to realize the random choice of the measure-
ment basis, we let the photon pass through a 50-50 beam
splitter (BS) as in Fig. 2(b). The half-wave plates
(HWP) in front of PBS1 is oriented at 22.5
0 to measure
the photon along the linear polarization basis x+/x−,
and the quarter-wave plate (QWP) in front of PBS2 is
oriented at 450 to measure the photon along the circu-
lar polarization basis y+/y−. In our experimental veri-
fication of the QSS and TQC schemes, Alice, Bob and
Charlie only individually record the measurement results
(including the basis chosen) for those events where one
and only one click is registered at each of the four detec-
tors. All together, 13 single-photon detectors have been
used during the whole experiment.
In the QSS scheme, after the measurement run Alice,
Bob and Charlie announce the basis of their measurement
results in public. By only keeping those coincident events
corresponding to an xxx, xyy, yxy or yyx measurement,
which occur in half of the cases, they can generate the raw
keys using the encoding rule as discussed in this paper.
In the experiment, Alice, Bob and Charlie collected 327
579 bits of key each at a rate of a quarter bit/s. To test
the security, 10% of the raw keys are used to calculate
the QBER by checking if each triplet is coincident by
Alice⊕Bob = Charlie in which ⊕ plays as the operator
of XOR. The QBER is observed to be 12.9%, which is
sufficient to ensure the security of the QSS scheme [3].
For correcting the remaining errors while maintaining
the secrecy of the keys, various classical error correc-
tion and privacy amplification schemes can be used. We
implemented a simple error reduction scheme requiring
only little communication between Alice, Bob and Char-
lie [13]. Each of them arranges their keys in blocks of bits
and evaluates the bit parity of the blocks (a single bit in-
dicating an odd or even number of ones in the block).
The parities are compared by Alice ⊕ Bob = Charlie
in public, and the blocks with agreeing parities are kept
after discarding one bit per block. Since parity checks
reveal only odd occurrences of bit errors, a fraction of
errors remains. The optimal block length n should be
determined by a compromise between key losses and re-
maining bit errors. In order to obtain a final key with
a low QBER, we implemented the parity check for two
times and the first we use the block length n of 2. After
4FIG. 3: Sharing a secret image. Charlie encrypts the image
of the “Great Wall” via bitwise XOR operation with his key
and transmits the encrypted image to Alice and Bob via the
computer network. None of Alice and Bob can decrypt the
image with her or his own key, but they can cooperate to
decrypt the image. The final image cooperatively obtained by
Alice and Bob shows only a few errors due to the remaining
bit errors in the keys (0.35%).
that we got 117 616 bits of key with a QBER of 2.2%.
Again by the block length n of 8, we got 87 666 bits of
key with a QBER of 0.35%.
Finally, Charlie uses the corrected key to transmit a 76
160-bit large image to Alice and Bob via two one-time-
pad protocols, utilizing a bitwise XOR combination of
message and key data. As shown in Fig. 3, Alice and
Bob can’t get any information only with their own keys.
But they can read it with few errors by cooperating.
We now show how the same experimental data can
also be used to provide an experimental demonstration
of TQC. In the TQC, if Charlie allows Alice and Bob to
generate the secret keys with each other, he will faith-
fully announce all his information, not only the basis he
has chosen but also his measurement results. Knowing
Charlie’s measurement results, Alice then performs an
XOR operation between her and Charlie’s keys. Thus,
using the same experimental data Alice and Bob can
each obtain 327 579 bits of raw keys with a QBER of
12.9%. After QBER checking and error reduction, they
finally obtained 87 666 bits cured keys with a QBER of
0.35%. And, if Charlie does not want Alice and Bob
to generate the secret key, he simply chooses not to an-
nounce his measurement results, or do not perform any
measurement on his photon. Without knowing Char-
lie’s results, the only thing Alice and Bob can do is to
randomly guess Charlie’s results and continue the same
encoding and error reduction procedure. In our experi-
ment, after performing twice error reductions, the QBER
remains 49.999%. All these together clearly confirm that
Charlie can successfully control the secure communica-
tion between Alice and Bob.
We thus for the first time experimentally demonstrated
the QSS and TQC. Compared to the quantum cryptogra-
phy based on single photons, the QSS and TQC schemes
allow richer and more flexible quantum communications.
First, in the multi-party QSS any individual can force
the others to cooperate to be able to establish the se-
cret keys with her/him [4]. Moreover, with the future
development of quantum repeaters [14] one can achieve
the QSS or TQC over large distances, without worrying
about the effects of attenuation and noise on, say, single
photons sent through a long optical fiber. Finally, the
entanglement-assisted QSS and TQC have the advantage
of still being possible in situations where, for example
three parties, Alice, Bob and Charlie, after sharing their
storable multi-particle entanglement [15, 16], have wan-
dered about independently and no longer know each oth-
ers’ locations. They cannot reliably send single particles
to each other, if they do not know where others are; but
they can still realize QSS and TQC, by broadcasting the
classical information to all places where they might be.
Therefore, while in large scale realization further prac-
tical investigations are still necessary for improving the
limited multi-fold coincidence rate, we believe that the
QSS and TQC could very well be tomorrow’s technology
for advanced quantum communication.
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